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      <title>halfdog.net security news</title>
      <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/</link>
      <description>Halfdog IT-security news channel: an automated way to get new information independent from third parties. The main topics are application and operating system security, secure programming, vulnerability analysis and exploitation, security best practices.</description>
      <language>en-us</language>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2015 12:25:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>Sun, 07 Jan 2018 12:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
      <ttl>60</ttl>
      <category>IT Security</category>
      <copyright>Copyright 2015-2017 me at halfdog.net</copyright>
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      <managingEditor>me at halfdog.net @ keep-validator-happy</managingEditor>
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      <item>
         <title>D-RamPage safe row-hammer privilege escalation</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SafeRowhammerPrivilegeEscalation/</link>
         <description>Publication: description of novel approach
for completely risk-free exploitation of row-hammer bugs on Linux
systems. The D-RamPage POC allows a disk cache page of a critical
system component, e.g. a SUID-binary, to be modified again and
again until escalation is possible. With proper preparation, this
is done without crashing the system when escalation fails. Read
more at https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SafeRowhammerPrivilegeEscalation/</description>
         <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2015 12:25:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20150316-SafeRowhammerPrivilegeEscalation</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>TIOCSTI: a gift that keeps on giving, now to OpenSSH</title>
         <link>http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/09/03/1</link>
         <description>The feature to write back characters to
a TTY or pseudo-terminal might be anachronistic today. But as
long as it is here, it is always good to make an annoyance, e.g.
a leaked file descriptor, or like with OpenSSH wrong permissions,
a neat privilege escalation vulnerability. But perhaps this feature
is now getting the same treatment as ptrace - making definition
of caller context more strict - or even more? See
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/09/03/1</description>
         <pubDate>Sat, 5 Sep 2015 07:09:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/09/03/1#1441436991</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Apport crash handling symlink attacks for privilege escalation</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/ApportKernelCrashdumpFileAccessVulnerabilities/</link>
         <description>Publication: Ubuntu comes with apport tool
for automatic crash reporting. kernel_crashdump is prone to sym-
and hardlink attacks, thus allowing denial of service or local
root privilege escalation on some systems. Read more at
https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/ApportKernelCrashdumpFileAccessVulnerabilities/</description>
         <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20150924-ApportKernelCrashdumpFileAccessVulnerabilities</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Mandb user man to root local privilege escalation</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/</link>
         <description>Publication: On some Linux systems, man
database comes with cleanup job to remove catman pages created
as user man. A hardlink attack combined with TOCTOU-vulnerability
allows privilege escalantion. Read more at https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/MandbSymlinkLocalRootPrivilegeEscalation/</description>
         <pubDate>Mon, 14 Dec 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20151214-MandbCleanupCronJobyPrivilegeEscalation</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Setgid directory privilege escalation</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/</link>
         <description>Publication: On some Linux systems,
directories with setgid bit set may be found. If a user not belonging
to that group is allowed to write to it, he may escalate privileges
to that group as demonstrated with group man on Ubuntu Vivid.
Read more at https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/</description>
         <pubDate>Mon, 14 Dec 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20151214-SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Linux user namespaces overlayfs local root</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/UserNamespaceOverlayfsSetuidWriteExec/</link>
         <description>Publication: Linux user namespaces overlayfs
local root: Overlayfs in user namespaces were missing a permission
check, thus allowing to create modified suid binaries to escalate
privileges, e.g. on Ubuntu Wily. Read more at https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/UserNamespaceOverlayfsSetuidWriteExec/.</description>
         <pubDate>Sun, 10 Jan 2016 13:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20160110-UserNamespaceOverlayfsSetuidWriteExec</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>NTP user root privilege escalation via statsdir daily cronjob</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/NtpCronjobUserNtpToRootPrivilegeEscalation/</link>
         <description>Publication: NTP user root privilege escalation
via statsdir daily cronjob: The cronjob script bundled with ntp
package on Ubuntu is intended to perform cleanup on statistics
files produced by NTP daemon running with statistics enabled.
The script is run as root during the daily cronjobs all operations
on the ntp-user controlled statistics directory. Various flaws
allow to escalate from ntp user to root. Read more at
https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/NtpCronjobUserNtpToRootPrivilegeEscalation/.</description>
         <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2016 19:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20160121-NtpCronjobUserNtpToRootPrivilegeEscalation</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Access to all /dev/pts devices via pt_chown and user namespaces</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/PtChownArbitraryPtsAccessViaUserNamespace/</link>
         <description>Publication: /usr/lib/pt_chown was used
to change ownership of slave pts devices in /dev/pts to the same
uid holding the master file descriptor for the slave. Another devpts
instance mountend within user namespace allows unprivileged user
to fool pt_chown to operate on file descriptors from inside
namespace but change ownership of device with same number outside
the namespace. Read more at
https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/PtChownArbitraryPtsAccessViaUserNamespace/.</description>
         <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2016 22:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20160222-PtChownArbitraryPtsAccessViaUserNamespace</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>User Namespaces Overlayfs Xattr Setgid Privilege Escalation</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/UserNamespaceOverlayfsXattrSetgidPrivilegeEscalation/</link>
         <description>Publication: Overlayfs allows to mix content
of two filesystems, e.g. read-only medium with r/w RAM-fs. This
is also allowed within user namespaces. As overlayfs does not
initialize xattr ACLs when copying files, malicious user may gain
write access to SGID directories and further gain full member access to
that group. As member of group root or staff escalation to user
root might be simple. Read more at
https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/UserNamespaceOverlayfsXattrSetgidPrivilegeEscalation/.</description>
         <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2016 22:15:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20160222-UserNamespaceOverlayfsXattrSetgidPrivilegeEscalation</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Overlayfs over Fuse Privilege Escalation</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/OverlayfsOverFusePrivilegeEscalation/</link>
         <description>Publication: On some systems, e.g. Ubuntu
Wily, it is possible to place an USERNS overlayfs mount over a
fuse (file system in userspace) mount. Inactive SUID binaries
in the user-controllable fuse filesystem may then be copied to
other filesystems in copy_up, thus allowing unprivileged users
to create arbitrary SUID binaries on the disk. Read more at
https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/OverlayfsOverFusePrivilegeEscalation/.</description>
         <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2016 22:15:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20160222-OverlayfsOverFusePrivilegeEscalation</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Aufs Union Filesystem Privilege Escalation In User Namespaces</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/AufsPrivilegeEscalationInUserNamespaces/</link>
         <description>Publication: Aufs is a union filesystem
to mix content of different underlying filesystems, e.g. read-only
medium with r/w RAM-fs. That is also allowed in user namespaces
when module was loaded with allow_userns option. Due to different
bugs, aufs in a crafted USERNS allows privilege escalation, which
is a problem on systems enabling unprivileged USERNS by default,
e.g. Ubuntu Wily. Read more at
https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/AufsPrivilegeEscalationInUserNamespaces/.</description>
         <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2016 22:45:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20160222-AufsPrivilegeEscalationInUserNamespaces</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Debian Exim Spool Directory Races Local Root</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/DebianEximSpoolLocalRoot/</link>
         <description>Publication: Exim4 is started as root but
switches to uid/gid Debian-exim/Debian-exim. To regain privileges
for mailbox delivery, it may re-invoke exim4 SUID binary. A race
in spool directory handling will thus allow any Debian-exim process
to escalate to root. Read more at
[https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/DebianEximSpoolLocalRoot/].
</description>
         <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jun 2016 04:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20160630-DebianEximSpoolLocalRoot</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Debian Exim Spool Directory Races Local Root Fixed</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/DebianEximSpoolLocalRoot/</link>
         <description>Update: The issue was fixed with latest Exim
release, see also [https://lists.exim.org/lurker/message/20161225.101705.4bbe7ae8.en.html].
</description>
         <pubDate>Fri, 30 Dec 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/index.html#Log20160630-DebianEximSpoolLocalRoot-Followup20161230</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Exploitation in the Wild of SGID Directory/SUID File Kernel Inconsistencies</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/AufsPrivilegeEscalationInUserNamespaces/</link>
         <description>In the last days, I observed increased interest in this topic. As those subtle POSIX specification inconsistencies and kernel bugs are quite old and exploitation technique variations are numerous, e.g. using USERNS, overlayfs, fuse, ..., this might whole story might haunt various systems for quite some time. Here [0] is a nice example, how this tools are used in the wild - as machines are still vulnerable - BUT you might notice: final exploitation was not even attempted. So to the script kiddies do not stop, when you see the first "uid=0" line on the console. Read articles/POCs to the end because root in USERNS is NOT real root!
[0] https://medium.com/@3wem/pluck-d5d1c05ab2e0
</description>
         <pubDate>Sat, 18 Mar 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/AufsPrivilegeEscalationInUserNamespaces/?rssGuid=20170318</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>GuerillaBackup packages available for Debian</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20161230-GuerillaBackup</link>
         <description>GuerillaBackup is designed to be a lightweight, resilient, distributed backup and archiving solution with security in mind. It allows to build own backup and transfer flows with one-way data encryption at source, support for GDPR-compliant logfile archiving, transfer without requiring remote code execution capable access to machines and high network bandwith. The Debian inclusion is ongoing, see [0], also the best source for the packages. The documentation and sources are here [1], excluding the changes currently in Debian review process.
[0] https://mentors.debian.net/package/guerillabackup
[1] https://github.com/halfdog/guerillabackup
</description>
         <pubDate>Mon, 11 Dec 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20161230-GuerillaBackup?rssGuid=20171211</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Gain Access to SSH Group via ssh-agent and OpenSSL</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20171225-SshAgentGroupPrivEsc</link>
         <description>ssh-agent on Debian from the openssh-client
is a set-group-id binary to prevent ptracing. While the anti-ptrace
measures are still effective, ssh-agent itself can be used to
gain access to the group 'ssh' via the OpenSSL library. As the
group is only used by the agent, this seems not cause any further
security implications. Read more at https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2017/SshAgentGainGroupPrivileges/ ...
</description>
         <pubDate>Mon, 25 Dec 2017 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20171225-SshAgentGroupPrivEsc?rssGuid=20171225</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>OpenSSH sftp code execution with writable</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20180108-OpensshSftpChrootCodeExecution</link>
         <description>The sftp component from OpenSSH provides
a chroot-feature for hardening. It is stated in documentation,
that the chroot root directory must not be writable. This page
documents some analysis results following discussion on openssh-dev
mailing list. Some people were questioning the read-only restriction.
Here should be some arguments, why it still makes sense in 2018.
Read more at https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2018/OpensshSftpChrootCodeExecution/ ...
</description>
         <pubDate>Sun, 07 Jan 2018 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20180108-OpensshSftpChrootCodeExecution?rssGuid=20180107</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Libc realpath buffer underflow</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20180111-LibcRealpathBufferUnderflow</link>
         <description>Current glibc6 implementation contains an
exploitable buffer underflow in realpath() when Linux kernel getcwd()
returns a path not starting with a slash. When exploited, privilege
escalation is possible as demonstrated with Ubuntu/Stretch umount.
Read more at https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2017/LibcRealpathBufferUnderflow/ ...
</description>
         <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20180111-LibcRealpathBufferUnderflow?rssGuid=20180111</guid>
      </item>

      <item>
         <title>Glibc CVE-2018-1000001 PoC</title>
         <link>https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20180111-LibcRealpathBufferUnderflow</link>
         <description>Finally releasing the escalation PoC 17
days after informing distros and 5 days after disclosure. It is
intended as demonstration of ASLR-aware exploitation techniques.
Relative binary offsets may be different for various Linux distributions
and builds. Please send me a patch when you developed a new set
of parameters and want to contribute them. Read more at
https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2017/LibcRealpathBufferUnderflow/ ...
</description>
         <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jan 2018 18:45:00 +0000</pubDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.halfdog.net/Security/#Log20180111-LibcRealpathBufferUnderflow?rssGuid=20180116</guid>
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